Chip Subsidies Compared: US Takes an Intel Stake, EU Drafts Chips Act 2.0, Japan Funds Rapidus and Korea Legislates

In August 2025 the US government became one of Intel’s largest shareholders. It took 9.9% of the company, 433.3 million shares at $20.47 each, for $8.9 billion. The money wasn’t new. It was $5.7 billion of CHIPS Act grants Intel hadn’t yet received, plus $3.2 billion from a defence programme for secure chips, converted from grants into equity.

Four years after the big chip subsidy laws, the four main manufacturing democracies outside Taiwan are spending in very different ways. Washington is turning grants into deals. Brussels is rewriting its law after admitting the target was out of reach. Tokyo is pouring money into one national champion. Seoul has moved from subsidies to legislation and funds.

United States: from grants to deals

The CHIPS Act of 2022 provided $39 billion for manufacturing incentives through fiscal 2026. By the end of January 2025, 19 companies had been awarded up to $30.7 billion for 40 projects. The largest final awards went to TSMC Arizona ($11.6 billion), Intel ($7.9 billion), Micron ($6.4 billion) and Samsung ($4.7 billion).

The new administration kept the money and changed the terms. In March 2025 an executive order put a new US Investment Accelerator in charge of the CHIPS office. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said in June that subsidies of 4% or less of a project’s value were about right. TSMC kept its award while adding $100 billion to its US investment pledge. As of July 2026 the Congressional Research Service found no award formally cut, though twelve companies with preliminary terms still had no final agreement.

Projects are slipping. Intel’s Ohio fab is pushed to 2030, and so is Micron’s plant in Clay, New York. To qualify for the 35% investment tax credit, construction has to start by the end of 2026.

Europe: a target quietly dropped

The EU Chips Act set a goal of 20% of global chip production by 2030. In April 2025 the European Court of Auditors said that was unlikely. The Commission’s own forecast was 11.7%, up only from 9.8% in 2022. Of about €86 billion in total funding, the Commission itself manages about €4.5 billion. The rest depends on member states and companies. Intel’s planned fabs in Magdeburg and Wrocław were on hold.

On 3 June 2026 the Commission proposed a Chips Act 2.0. It extends the Chips for Europe initiative, creates categories for first-of-a-kind and strategic projects, sets a maximum of twelve months for permits and adds a supply-chain platform for companies. It names no market share target and no new headline budget. Money after 2027 depends on the next EU budget, for 2028 to 2034. Council talks resumed in September.

Japan: one champion, state-owned in part

Japan has bet on Rapidus, a company formed to make 2-nanometre chips in Hokkaido. In April 2026 the trade ministry added ¥631.5 billion, taking cumulative government research support to ¥2.35 trillion. The government also took equity, through its IT promotion agency, and is now Rapidus’s largest shareholder. The target is volume production in fiscal 2027 and a stock market listing in fiscal 2031.

Japan also pays foreign manufacturers to come. TSMC’s first fab in Kumamoto got ¥476 billion in subsidies. The second got up to ¥732 billion, and in March 2026 it was upgraded to make 3-nanometre chips from 2028.

South Korea: laws and funds

Korea’s champions, Samsung and SK Hynix, already lead in memory, so Seoul has focused on keeping investment at home. In April 2025 it raised its support package to ₩33 trillion, about $23 billion. In January 2026 the National Assembly passed a Semiconductor Special Act on clusters, infrastructure and tax breaks, though it dropped an exemption from the 52-hour working week that the industry wanted. In August it launched a ₩5 trillion chip fund and named a new cluster in the south-west.

What the comparison shows

Every government says it wants supply chain security. They define it differently. The US wants advanced fabs on its soil and now wants a return on its money. The EU wants a bigger share of a market it mostly doesn’t control, and its central budget is small. Japan wants a national leading-edge maker. Korea wants its existing leaders to stay.

The clearest lesson so far is about money and control. Where the state spends directly and decides fast, as in Japan, money reaches projects quickly, though Rapidus still has to prove it can make chips at scale. Where the state depends on companies’ own plans, as in Europe, projects wait when the companies change their minds. Washington’s equity stakes are an attempt to get more control for the same money. Whether that speeds anything up will show in Ohio before 2030.